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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

KIRSTEEN BLOCKER a.k.a. Morkel,
Petitioner and Appellee,
vs.

Appeal No. -CA

MICHAEL BLOCKER,
Respondant and Appellant.
---0000000---

Jurisdictional Statement

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h).

a.

Statement of Issues & Standard of Review
Issue: Did the trial court err when it failed to state any finding that there had

been a material change in the circumstances upon which the previous visitation award was
based when it granted Petitioner's Petition to Modify and remove all conditions for her
unsupervised visitation?

Standard of review: The standard of review for this issue, as an issue of law, is de novo.

Hogge v Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (1982).

b.

Did the trial court err when it decided that Petitioner's inability to comply with

conditions for her unsupervised parent time constituted a material change in circumstances
..ai

upon which to base a modification of a custody award?
1

Standard of review: The standard of review for this issue, as an issue of law, is de novo.

Hogge v Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (1982).

c.

Did the trial court err when it signed the Order drafted by Petitioner's counsel a

mere 3 days after it was submitted (when those days included a legal holiday and a weekend)
when Petitioner's counsel had not served it on Respondent and when Respondent was not
given the proper time to file an objection but did file a timely objection once he, on his own,
found out about the existence of the Order?

Standard of review: The standard of review for this issue, as an issue of law, is de novo.

Hogge v Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (1982).

d.

Did the trial court err when it deprived Respondent of his right to Due Process

by refusing to allow him to argue his Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition to Modify during
the hearing and instead merely stated that he had made his decision and was going to grant the
Petition, the judge signed the Order without notifying the Respondent and never sent a copy of
the Order to the Respondent, failed to act on two properly noticed and submitted motions that
were not objected to for a period of six months, and when the judge changed a status
conference into an evidentiary hearing without notice and did not give Respondent an
opportunity to prepare or rebut Petitioner's witnesses?

Standard of review: The standard of review for this issue, as an issue of law, is de novo.

Hogge v Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (1982).
2

e.

Did the trial court err when converted Petitioner's Order to Show Cause into a

Petition to Modify when the Petitioner herself stated on the Record that she was not seeking a
Petition to Modify but only to have the court rule on who was in compliance with the existing
order?

Standard of review: The standard of review for this issue, as an issue of law, is de novo.
~

Hogge v Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (1982). However, it is possible that the court has some discretion in
this matter, in which case the standard of review would be abuse of discretion.

·IJ!J

Statutory Provisions

The relevant portions of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7 are included in the Appendix.

Statement of the Case

This is an appeal from the Order Modifying Custody Order (see Appendix) granted by
the Fourth District Court, Utah County, granting Morkel's Order to Show Cause, which was

sua sponte converted into a Petition to Modify by Judge Taylor. In addition Judge Taylor
refused to hear or rule on Blocker's properly pled and submitted motions, failed to allow
,.p

Blocker to argue his case before the court, and did not give Blocker an opportunity to object
to the Order once it was written and submitted by Morkel's counsel.

3

Statement of the Facts
Issue 1: The trial court's Order does not include any findings of fact at all. It simply
states a conclusion that Morkel's Petition is granted and her visitation is now to be
unsupervised without condition. Despite Blocker's repeated request that Judge Taylor give a
reasoning for his order and Blocker's repeated citing of Hogge v. Hogge, the Judge simply stated,
"I'm familiar with the law. That's my ruling." (Transcript June 10, 2015, page 9 lines 14-15)
and "That's my ruling. I have wide discretion in these matters." (Transcript June 10, 2015,
page 9 lines 18-19). And then when asked to specify where he found a material change in
circumstances as required to support Morkel's Petition to Modify, Judge Taylor was unable to
do so, instead stating, "I think there is satisfactory evidence in this file to demonstrate that
what I'm ruling is in the best interest of the child. That's my order." (Transcript, June 10,
2015, page 11, lines 18-20.)

Issue 2: When Judge Davis originally ordered that Morkel's parent time visitation
would be supervised unless certain conditions were satisfied some of the bases for that order
were that he was giving her "one last chance" to show that she could follow court orders,
cooperate with professionals, and to insure that she was working with the court-appointed
therapist to address her parenting and co-parenting issues so that she could see her own
negative behaviors and their impacts on our son and her own inabilities to reason, to identify
her own issues and take responsibility for them. (See Findings of Fact, Order, and Judgement
of Judge Davis Signed February 22, 2010 in Appendix.) In his Order Judge Davis stated that
it was anticipated the Markel would make some improvements: The Court is hopeful and
expects that Kirsteen Morkel will make significant progress in both her parenting skills and in
4
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her relationship with Mackay and Michael Blocker." Judge Davis specifically did this at the
urging of the Guardian ad Litem so that such improvement would not constitute a change in
circumstances for purposes of modifying the order later.
Not only has Morkel not made any improvements, she has continued her bad behavior
and Judge Taylor used that very bad behavior as justification for modifying the Order. When
Morkel filed her Order to Show Cause both parties and the Judge clearly stated on the Record
that this was not a Petition to Modify and was not going to be a Petition to Modify but was an
Order to Show Cause asking the court to determine who was in compliance with Judge
Davis's Order. However, when we came to court the next time,Judge Taylor in and of
himself stated that it was impossible for Morkel to comply with the Order because she had
sued the Special Master, the Guardian ad Litem, Blocker's Attorneys, and Judge Davis in
Federal Court1 and had threatened to sue the court-appointed conjoint therapist and child's
therapist. Judge Taylor further acknowledged that Morkel came to the court with unclean
hands in the matter, but nevertheless, he sua sponte turned her Order to Show Cause into a
Petition to Modify and ordered a superficial "Home Visit Report," by a therapist of Morkel's
choosing. 2

Issue 3: At the hearing on June 10, 2015,Judge Taylor instructed Morkel's Counsel to
draft the order. According to the Certificate of Service, Petitioner's Counsel claims he mailed
Waddoups granted Defendants' Motions to Dismiss in that case. Morkel unsuccessfully appealed to the Tenth
Circuit. Judge Taylor was fully aware of Morkel's behavior in that case and her actions to use litigation tactics to remove
more than 20 past court-appointed professionals from this case.
2 This report was later conducted by an unlicensed therapist who was sanctioned, issued a cease and desist letter, and fined
by the Department of Professional Licensing for her involvement and report in this case. Nevertheless,Judge Taylor
refused to strike the report or to remove the unlicensed therapist from the case despite Blocker's properly pled and
submitted motion to do so.
1 Judge

5

a copy of proposed order to Respondent on June 25, 2015. Respondent never received a
mailing. 3 On Thursday,July 2, 2015, Petitioner's Counsel filed the proposed order with the

~I

court. Judge Taylor signed the proposed order the very next business day, on Monday,July 6.
Blocker found out about the order through Xchange on July 14 and immediately filed an
objection to the proposed order with the court within the 10 day period, even though it had
already been signed previously. (See copy in Appendix). No response was ever given to
Blocker's objection. Further, Blocker never received a copy nor any notice from the court
that the Order had been received or signed.

Issue 4: In advance of the hearing to be held on April 16, 2014 the court scheduled
hearing to address Morkel's Order to Show Cause to Enforce the Order. Both parties
expressly stated on the record that they were not seeking to modify the order but merely to
have the court rule on who was in compliance with the existing order. Judge Taylor agreed
that this was the purpose of the hearing. All parties and the judge explicitly agreed that this
was not a Petition to Modify and was not going to be Petition to Modify but rather a hearing
to determine who was in compliance. However, when the hearing actually took place,Judge
Taylor sua spontc changed Morkel's Motion into a Petition to Modify based on the Morkel's
noncompliance with the order putting her in a position where she couldn't comply with the
order because she had sued the special master, the Guardian Ad Litem, and threatened to sue
the child's court-appointed therapist.

The certificate of service also notes that "counsel of record" was served, however, as Petitioner's counsel was fully aware,
Respondent's counsel, who had only made a limited appearance for a single hearing that was never held, officially
withdrew at the beginning of the June 10 hearing and was not involved in that hearing. .Additionally, said counsel also did
not receive any proposed order in this matter.
6
3
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On August 1, 2014 the court had a status conference scheduled in this case. The
parties were both told that this was to be a status conference and nothing more. However,
Morkel came to court with her expert, Victoria Burgess, and proceeded to introduce the
report written by Ms. Burgess and ask the court to accept the report and grant her Petition to
Modify at that time. Although the parties were explicitly told that this was NOT going to be
an evidentiary hearing, the court agreed to accept the report. When Blocker objected to the
admission of the report,Judge Taylor told Blocker that he could cross-examine Ms. Burgess.
When Blocker said that he was not prepared to do so because the hearing was to be a status
conference and not an evidentiary hearing, he was told that was his opportunity to question
the witness. Because he was not prepared to do so, the witness did not take the stand, Judge
Taylor accepted the report without any cross examination.
On November 21, 2014 Blocker filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on two motions,
first a Motion to Dismiss Morkel's Petition to Modify and second, a Motion to Strike the
Home Visit Report of Victoria Burgess. Judge Taylor never scheduled a hearing, signed,
denied, or took any action on either of Blocker's motions. Instead he simply waited until June
2015 and summarily granted Morkel's Petition to Modify without any argument and without
giving Blocker an opportunity to even argue his Motion to Dismiss or Motion to Strike even
though they had been properly noticed for decision.
At the June 10, 2015 hearing Judge Taylor refused to allow Blocker to argue his Motion
to Dismiss Morkel's Petition to Modify during the hearing and instead merely stated that
Judge Taylor had made his decision and was going to grant the Petition. First, when the Judge
asked Blocker to tell him what was pending before the court for that hearing and Blocker tried
7

to state what was pending, the Judge immediately cut him off, would not let him state the two
motions that he had properly pending before the court (that had been properly noticed and
submitted for decision) and instead went to Morkel's counsel and asked him to set the agenda
for the hearing. (See Transcript in Appendix) Second, when Judge Taylor made his ruling
Blocker tried to make the legal argument that Utah case law in Hogge v. Hogge did not allow
the ruling (the argument he wanted to make initially),Judge Taylor cut him off and simply said
that he had "broad discretion in these matters" and refused to give any basis in law for his
decision. Curtly he told Blocker, "I'm sorry that you don't understand what I've ruled and the
basis of my jurisdiction -Mr. Blocker, I'm sorry that you don't get it. I've made my ruling. I
have earlier indicated I would treat the petition to modify- or the order to show cause as a
petition to modify.

I think there's satisfac - satisfactory evidence in this file to demonstrate

that what I'm ruling is in the best interest of the child.

That's my order." (Transcript June

10, 2015, page 11, lines 13-20).
Judge Taylor refused to hear or respond to Blocker's legal arguments on either of his
properly pending motions. Then although it was Morkel's burden to show that her
circumstances had changed to sufficient to warrant a modification of the custody order against
her, Judge Taylor actually placed the burden on Blocker, saying, "I want you to tell me why I
should make a change [back to what was in Judge Davis's Order and not Taylor's temporary
order]. Why is the status quo [giving Morkel unconditional visitation] not best for your child?"
(franscript,June 10, 2015, page 6, lines 11-13). When Blocker tried to explain that nothing in
Morkel's behavior had ever changed including the reasons why Morkel had lost custody in the
first place, Judge Taylor again put the burden on Blocker asking for specific negative behavior
8

during the past year. (Transcript,June 10, 2015, page 6, lines 14-18). Blocker did what he
could to explain the situation and even offered that the child's court-appointed therapist
would be able to testify to the continuing harm Morkel causes the child, but Judge Taylor was
uninterested, and instead decided that because the files was, in his words, "a procedural mess,"
and "really hard to figure out what's going in this case," that instead of trying to figure out
whether the circumstances had actually changed, he would treat his temporary order as the
"permanent state of affairs." (Transcript, June 15, 2015, page 8).
As outlined above Judge Taylor signed the Order without notifying Blocker and never
sent a copy of the Order to Blocker.

Issue 5: In advance of the hearing to be held on April 16, 2014 the court scheduled
.J

hearing to address Morkel's Order to Show Cause to Enforce the Order. Both parties
expressly stated on the record that they were not seeking to modify the order but merely to
have the court rule on who was in compliance with the existing order. Judge Taylor agreed

"4'J)

that this was the purpose of the hearing. All parties and the judge explicitly agreed that this
was not a Petition to Modify and was not going to be Petition to Modify but rather a hearing
--.d

to determine who was in compliance. However, when the hearing actually took place,Judge
Taylor sua sponte changed Morkel's Motion into a Petition to Modify based on the Morkel's
noncompliance with the order putting her in a position where she couldn't comply with the
order because she had sued the special master, the Guardian Ad Litem, and threatened to sue
the child's court-appointed therapist.

9

Summary of the Argument

The Court should reverse the trial court's grant of Morkel's petition to modify because
she did not show a material change in circumstances to justify such a modification and the
court denied Blocker due process in summarily finding a change when none was proved.
The trial court erred when it failed to state any finding that there had been a material
change in the circumstances upon which the previous visitation award was based when it
granted Morkel's Petition to Modify and removed all conditions for her unsupervised
visitati.on.
The trial court erred when it decided that Morkel's inability to comply with conditions
for her unsupervised parent time constituted a material change in circumstances upon which
to base a modification of a custody award.
The trial court erred when it signed the Order drafted by Morkel' s counsel a mere three
(3) days after it was submitted (when those days included a legal holiday and a weekend) when
Markel' s counsel had not served it on Blocker and when Blocker was not given the proper
time to file an objection but did file a timely objection once he, on his own, found out about
the existence of the Order?
The trial court err when it deprived Blocker of his right to Due Process by refusing to
allow him to argue his Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition to Modify during the hearing
and instead merely stated that he had made his decision and was going to grant the Petition,
the judge signed the Order without notifying Blocker and never sent a copy of the Order to
Blocker, failed to act on two properly noticed and submitted motions that were not objected
to for a period of six months, and when the judge changed a status conference into an
10

evidentiary hearing without notice and did not give Blocker an opportunity to prepare or rebut
Morkel' s witnesses.
The trial court err when it converted Morkel's Order to Show Cause into a Petition to
Modify when Morkel herself stated on the Record that she was not seeking a Petition to
Modify but only to have the court rule on who was in compliance with the existing order.

Argument

-~

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF MORKEL'S
PETITION TO MODIFY BECAUSE SHE DID NOT SHOW A MATERIAL CHANGE
IN CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY SUCH A MODIFICATION AND THE COURT
DENIED BLOCKER DUE PROCESS IN SUMMARILY FINDING A CHANGE WHEN
NONE WAS PROVED.
A.

The trial court erred when it failed to state any finding that there had been a
material change in the circumstances upon which the previous visitation award
was based when it granted Morkel's Petition to Modify and removed all
conditions for her unsupervised visitation.

In Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 54 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court expressly requires
a trial court to articulate a specific finding in its order showing that there has been a material
change in circumstances before it grants a Petition to Modify a Custody Award. The Court
..J

stated, "Accordingly, we hold that in the future a trial court's decision to modify a decree by
transferring custody of a minor child must involve two separate steps. In the initial step, the
court will receive evidence only as to the nature and materiality of any changes in those
circumstances upon which the earlier award of custody was based. In this step, the party
seeking modification must demonstrate (1) that since the time of the previous decree, there
have been changes in the circumstances upon which the previous award was based; and (2)
11

that those changes are sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the question of
custody. The trial court must make a separate finding as to whether this burden of proof

has been met. If so, the court, either as a continuation of the same hearing, or in a separate
hearing, will proceed to the second step. However, where that burden of proof is not met, the
trial court will not reach the second step, the petition to modify will be denied, and the
existing custody award will remain unchanged." Id. (emphasis added). Judge Taylor's order in
this case not only fails to have a "separate finding" as to whether Morkel met the burden of
proof for a change in circumstances, the order has no findings of fact at all. The Order has
only the declaration that the custody award is modified in Morkel's favor with no basis given
whatsoever. This clearly does not satisfy the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in

Hogge and alone requires reversal of the district court's order. However, even more important
than this technical violation of Hogge is the substantive violation that follows.

B.

The trial court erred when it decided that Morkel's inability to comply with
conditions for her unsupervised parent ti.me constituted a material change in
circumstances upon which to base a modification of a custody award.

In Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 54 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court expressly requires
a trial court to find a material change in circumstances before modifying a custody award.
This material change is not to any circumstance in the case but is required to be specifically to
"the circumstances upon which the previous award was based." Id.
The material change in circumstances in this case is Morkel's inability to comply with
the conditions of her unsupervised parent ti.me, including the appointment of and cooperation
with a special master, along with paying the fees of the Special Master, conjoint therapy with
12

Dr. Kirk Thorn, and individual therapy to address the issues outlined in Dr. Matt Davies's
report and the other reports listed in the court order. Because of Morkel's own actions the
special master, Sandra Dredge, has withdrawn from the case and Dr. Thorn is unable to
maintain a professional relationship with Markel. Because the alleged change is based on
Morkel's own actions to sabotage the conditions to have her gain unsupervised parent time,
she brings her motion to modify with unclean hands. Further, Markel sued Judge Davis, the
Special Master Sandra Dredge and the Guardian Ad Litem Kelly Peterson and threatened to
sue Dr. Kirk Thorn, Mackay's court appointed therapist that she was to be in conjoint therapy
with. Due to her actions, these court appointed experts had to withdraw from the case or
from working with her. Therefore her actions have made it impossible for her to fulfill her
pathway to receive statutory unsupervised parent time.)
In addressing this material change in circumstances, the trial court should have first

looked at whether there had been changes in the circumstances "upon which the previous
award was based." Those circumstances were Morkel's enmeshment with Mackay, her inability
to recognize her parenting issues, her ability to see and understand her issues that caused her
to lose custody, and her inability to support Mackay's relationship with his father. Under the
second part of the Hogge analysis Morkel would need to show substantial and material changes
to those circumstances-not changes in the circumstances related to the conditions placed on
her parent time. Therefore, if there was proof of a substantial change in circumstances, the
trial court should only have modified the order to allow Morkel to comply with conditions
similar to those in Judge Davis's original order. The trial court erred by striking any and all
conditions from the order. Morkel did nothing to show that her circumstances had changed
13

with regard to the facts that prompted Judge Davis to make her unsupervised parent time
conditional. As such, the trial court erred in modifying the order to give her unsupervised time
but, instead, should have imposed substitute conditions with which she could comply (e.g. a
new special master, a new conjoint therapist, or an arrangement for her individual therapist to
work with Dr. Thorn, Mackay's therapist, etc.). For this reason this Court should reverse the
trial court's grant of Morkel's Petition to Modify.

C.

The trial court erred when it signed the Order drafted by Morkel's counsel a
mere three (3) days after it was submitted (when those days included a legal
holiday and a weekend) when Morkel's counsel had not served it.on Blocker
and when Blocker was not given the proper time to file an objection but did file
a timely objection once he, on his own, found out about the existence of the
Order?

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7G) governs orders of the court. (see full text in
Appendix). Subsection G)(2) directs that "within 14 days of being directed by the court to
prepare a proposed order confirming the court's decision, a party must serve the proposed
order on the other parties for review and approval as to form." Id. Subsection G)(4) then
outlines that "a party may object to the form of the proposed order by filing an objection
within 7 days after the order is served." Id. Finally, Subsection G)(S) instructs counsel on the
filing of the proposed order, and states that the party preparing a proposed order must file it
when one of three conditions has occurred, 1) "after all other parties have approved the form
of the order (The party preparing the proposed order must indicate the means by which
approval was received: in person; by telephone; by signature; by email; etc.)"; 2) "after the time
to object to the form of the order has expired (The party preparing the proposed order must
also file a certificate of service of the proposed order)"; or 3) "within 7 days after a party has
14

objected to the form of the order (The party preparing the proposed order may also file a
,viJ

response to the objection)." Id

In this case Morkel's counsel did not follow any of the requirements of Rule 7 and
Judge Taylor furthered the violation of the Rule by signing the order a mere 3 days after it was
submitted to him and did nothing to remedy the situation when he received Blocker's timely
objection to the Order as soon as Blocker found out about the Order on his own by searching
~

Xchange a few days after the Order was signed. At the hearing on June 10, 2015, Judge
Taylor instructed Morkel's Counsel to draft the order. According to the Certificate of Service,
Petitioner's Counsel claims he mailed a copy of proposed order to Respondent on June 25,
2015. Respondent never received a mailing. On Thursday,July 2, 2015, Petitioner's Counsel
filed the proposed order with the court. Judge Taylor signed the proposed order the very next

~

business day, on Monday,July 6. Blocker found out about the order through Xchange on July
14 and immediately filed an objection to the proposed order with the court even though it had
already been signed previously. No response was ever given to Blocker's objection. Further,
Blocker never received a copy nor any notice from the court that the Order had been received
or signed.

15

D.

The trial court err when it deprived Blocker of his right to Due Process by
refusing to allow him to argue his Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition to
Modify during the hearing and instead merely stated that he had made his
decision and was going to grant the Petition, the judge signed the Order without
notif_yin,g Blocker and never sent a copy of the Order to Blocker, failed to act
on two properly noticed and submitted motions that were not objected to for a
period of six months, and when the judge changed a status conference into an
evidentiar_y hearing without notice and did not give Blocker an opportunity to
prepare or rebut Morkel's witnesses.

In Jensen ex rel Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ,r 95,250 P.3d 465,488 the Utah
Supreme Court stated, "Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution contains a procedural
component. Under it, "notice and opportunity to be heard ... must be observed in order to
have a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property." Wells v. Children's Aid Socy oJUtah,
681 P.2d 199,204 (Utah 1984). Additionally, "[t]o be considered a meaningful hearing, the
concerns of the affected parties should be heard by an impartial decision maker." Chen v.

Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ,r 68, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal quotation marks omitted)."
On August 1, 2014 the court had a status conference scheduled in this case. The
parties were both told that this was to be a status conference and nothing more. However,
Morkel came to court with her expert, Victoria Burgess, and proceeded to introduce the
report written by Ms. Burgess and ask the court to accept the report and grant her Petition to
Modify at that time. Although the parties were explicitly told that this was NOT going to be
an evidentiary hearing, the court agreed to accept the report. When Blocker objected to the
admission of the report, Judge Taylor told Blocker that he could cross-examine Ms. Burgess.
When Blocker said that he was not prepared to do so because the hearing was to be a status
conference and not an evidentiary hearing, he was told that was his opportunity to question
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the witness. Because he was not prepared to do so, the witness did not take the stand, Judge
'vi)

Taylor accepted the report without any cross examination.
This is analogous to a professional football coach and a professional referee and a
person who doesn't typically even play football scheduling a meeting to talk about a future
game but then coming to that meeting and having the professional coach show up with his
team ready to play and having the referee say "Let's play now." When Blocker said that he

·...rt)

thought the purpose of the meeting was to talk about the game and schedule it for another
ti.me, the referee, the Judge, said, "The other coach (meaning Markel's counsel) has his team
here ready to play ball now, so let's play. If you're not prepared and don't have your team
here it's your fault" The question becomes how does the novice get it right that the purpose
of the meeting is to schedule the future game, as the term "status conference" entails, but the
two experienced professionals come up with the same wrong answer?
In addition,Judge Taylor violated Blocker's due process rights by refusing to allow
Blocker to argue his Motion to Dismiss Morkel's Petition to Modify during the hearing and
instead merely stating that he had made his decision and was going to grant the Petition. If
Blocker is not allowed to rebut or quote the law how can due process take place? Blocker tried
to bring up the standard in Hogge v. Hogge and argue his position (that no change in
circumstance has been established by Markel and furthermore that her suing Judge Davis, The
Special Master and Guardian ad Litem was clear and convincing evidence that "this one last
chance" given to her by Judge Davis was disregarded by Markel. Although Judge Taylor had
knowledge of Morkel's ongoing behavior, he did not allow Blocker to make this argument.
Instead Judge Taylor willfully disregarded the evidence and in essence suppressed if not
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omitted the evidence and the law from being presented.)

Instead the Judge Taylor simply

said that he was aware of the law and that while Blocker may not like it, he was going to rule.
Essentially he said, "I know the law but I'm not going to follow it." Judge Taylor knowing the
law, willfully violated it, therefore willfully deprived Blocker's right to due process. If Judge
Taylor really was aware of the law then he knowingly violated it by denying Blocker the right to
argue his position, which implies a violation of due process.
Judge Taylor signed the Order without notifying Blocker and never sent a copy of the
Order to Blocker, --rules require that each party see the order prior to signing so that each
party has the opportunity to object if it isn't correct Again Blocker never receive a copy of the
order from either Mr. Felix/Morkel's attorney or Judge Taylor. The Appellate record includes
multiple "returned for improper address" notes, yet Mr. Blocker's address is correct on all of
his pleadings and on all documentation he has filed with the court.
Additionally Judge Taylor signed the court order almost immediately after receiving it
and did not wait for the 10 day period that is required. This implies that he had no intension of
considering any objection from Blocker or receiving any objection from Blocker.
Judge Taylor failed to act on two properly noticed and submitted motions for a period
of six months. These were a motion to dismiss and a motion to strike Dr. Burgess's report.
These motions were filed in November 2014 after Morkel's counsel responded to each of
them, the trial court never acted on either motion. In Feb 2015 Mr. Blocker submitted renewed
motions to dismiss that again were never responded to by Ms. Morkel or acted on by Judge
Taylor. Even at the hearing in 2015 Judge Taylor failed to address either motion. The Burgess
motion was clearly a motion that needed to be ruled on as her report formed a partial basis for
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Morkel's petition to modify as it was her only potential evidence. The fact Dr. Burgess's report
was found by the Department of Professional Licensing to be a violation of state law is
something that the trial court should have taken seriously and sought to remedy. The trial
court erred and violated Blocker's due process by not striking the illegal home visit report and
continuing to place credence in a report that by its very nature was deemed to be a violation of
the law. Not to mention that the report did not follow the guidelines that were ordered by the
trial court itself. In other words, the court had already made its decision regardless of the law
or lack of evidence, and when the judge changed a status conference into an evidentiary
hearing without notice and did not give Blocker an opportunity to prepare or rebut Morkel's
witnesses the court further violated Blocker's right to due process.
The court further violated Blocker's due process by converting Morkel's Order to Show
Cause into a Petition to Modify sua sponte when such wasn't properly before the court and was
against both parties' stated reasons for being there. Judge Taylor didn't offer Blocker the
opportunity to rebut, there was never a scheduled hearing for him to address it, there never was
an evidentiary hearing so there was never an opportunity to rebut the evidence but in addition
there was now no evidence at that point at all because the home study report from Burgess was
debunked and gone so there was no evidence supporting her petition at that point for Blocker
to refute at that point The only real evidence the court had was the evidence that showed that
Markel was still not willing to abide by Judge Davis's previous order. The court in essence said
that if she couldn't abide by the law then the law would need to change to abide by Morkel's
behavior and by so doing removed the requirement that were set in place to protect the child
and Blocker from Morkel's ongoing bad behavior.
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E.

The trial court err when it converted Morkel's Order to Show Cause into a
Petition to Modify when Morkel herself stated on the Record that she was not
seeking a Petition to Modify but only to have the court rule on who was in
compliance with the existing order.

There does not seem to be any Utah law on point as to whether a judge has the
authority to change a party's pleading to a different kind of pleading on his own without the
party's request and over the party's explicit prior statement that what the court was doing was

not what the party intended. However, such action seems to be contrary to basic principles of
justice.
Having been to court approximately 54 times on this case I have been told time and
time again that I can't bring something up that isn't properly before the court and that even if
we did the judge couldn't rule on it because it wasn't properly before the court So how does
a judge make up something on his own and rule on it when not only was it not even before
the court at all but both parties explicitly stated that it was not what they wanted-in fact
Morkel had specifically stated that she did NOT want to modify the custody order.
Judges should be able to suggest that it should have been a Petition to Modify rather
than an Order to Cause, giving parties options to consider is one thing, but when you are
clearly giving one party options to consider that will only benefit that party and not giving
general options to both parties, and especially when the judge is actually acting on behalf of
one party it puts the judge in position of attorney for the party rather than the position of an
impartial judge. The other party, especially when acting prose, is not only denied guidance
and suggestions but also due process. In essence the Judge acts as the party's attorney rather
than as the judge.
Thus the court further violated Blocker's due process by converting Morkel's Order to
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Show Cause into a Petition to Modify sua sponte when such wasn't properly before the court
and was against both parties' stated reasons for being there. Judge Taylor didn't offer Blocker
the opportunity to rebut, there was never a scheduled hearing for him to address it, there never
was an evidentiary hearing so there was never an opportunity to rebut the evidence but in
;~

addition there was now no evidence at that point at all because the home study report from
Burgess was debunked and gone so there was no evidence supporting her petition at that point
for Blocker to refute at that point. The only real evidence the court had was the evidence that
showed that Morkel was still not willing to abide by Judge Davis's previous order. The court in
essence said that if she couldn't abide by the law then the law would need to change to abide by
Morkel's behavior and by so doing removed the requirement that were set in place to protect
the child and Blocker from Morkel' s ongoing bad behavior.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons this Court should reverse the decision of the district court
and reinstate Judge Davis's Custody Order and give direction to the district court that any
modification to be made is only to substitute conditions for Morkel's unsupervised parent
time that are consistent with the original order. In addition, Blocker requests that this Court
award him the appropriate fees and costs associated with this appeal.
I'd like to give some perspective as to what this case has been like. To start off, we
have been to court approximately 54 times. And in addition to that, I've had multiple other
cases stemming from this case: one was a stalking injunction against Morkel and her parents,
which was awarded against her mother; one was a federal civil suit Morkel brought against me,
21

Judge Davis, the Special Master, the Guardian ad Litem, my attorneys, and others; and
multiple others that Morkel has brought about me and other professionals that have been
appointed or otherwise involved in this case. When I first started this process my attorney
explained that this isn't about right and wrong, it's about the law. Now having been in
litigation for more than thirteen years, I know it's not about right and wrong, and I know it's
not about the law either. It's about what some man who has authority wants to do. Right and
wrong, the law, and evidence are really not that important but are only factors in proceedings
and rulings. I thought from the beginning that Morkel's behavior would be obvious enough
that I had a chance of winning custody, after she had threatened to sue the first three courtappointed experts I thought that three would be sufficient for the court to see what was
happening and change custody. I was wrong. Custody didn't change until we had gone
through fifteen court-appointed experts and three custody evaluations. And Markel couldn't
call any of the fifteen to come and testify on her behalf, and most of the fifteen wrote
numerous letters to the court about her bad behavior and about they could not work with her.
What makes this even more absurd is that her attorneys (meaning she has gone through more
than a dozen of them) in almost every appointment chose the court-appointed expert. In fact,
the first court-appointed expert was Dr. John Skidmore. Dr. Skidmore was her expert witness
in our first trial in 2004. And after Judge Davis gave her custody he appointed her expert
witness to act as a special master even though he had been an expert who testified on her
behalf and had no experience whatsoever as a special master. After eight months with no
progress and no improvement on behalf of Morkel, Dr. Skidmore finally resigned stating that
he could not work with her.
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In 2007, on our son's fifth birthday, Markel accused me yet again of sexually molesting
him. When detective Gains of the Orem P.O. concluded his investigation, he said that he

could set his calendar by how often Markel comes in with a new accusation, and that he
would not do any further investigations regarding my son or me, unless the accusation came
from a credible third party professional. However, the following week Markel filed an exparte motion with 10 pages of sexual and other types of abuse by me against my son, with
Commissioner Patton in the Fourth District Court in Provo. This resulted in me being put on
supervised parent time, over a hundred hours of my attorney's time, a three hundred page
response by my attorney with more reports from my son's doctor, DCFS, Provo, Orem and
Sandy Police Departments, and past court-appointed experts and evaluator stating that her
allegations where unfounded and that she is the problem. Despite all of this, Commissioner
Patton gave her another chance and told her that if she did not follow his order, he would
change custody. Six months later our son's Guardian ad Litem and court-appointed therapist
came before Commissioner Patton, with pages of violations of the court order by Markel, and
the Guardian ad Litem argued and proffered on behalf of the therapist that our son was in
danger and that custody should be changed immediately. Commissioner Patton not only
ignored his previous order that he would change custody, he also ignored their testimony and
made an order giving Markel even more time. As unbelievable as this is, it is the pattern of
this case. Nearly two years later and two more custody evaluations, I received sole physical
and legal custody. The Custody evaluator that was chosen by Markel, stated that our son was
the most emotionally abused child that he had seen in his twenty years of practice. After all of
this, after spending and going into debt, I'm financially ruined. This case has cost well over
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$500,000, my attorney's file is over 8 ft. thick, and for the past two years I have, out of
necessity been representing myself. I have spent thousand if not tens of thousands of hour on
this case. Why? because I would not walk away from my son and because narcissistic Judges
think they know what's best and have no regard for the law.

If you read this and find it unbelievable, you ought to try living it.
It's tragic that my son has been so emotionally abused, but also tragic is the abuse that
he has suffered at the hands of the court system. The system itself is abusive by requiring a
child to go through years of examinations and litigation with expert after expert reaching the
same conclusion and yet doing nothing to stop it and the solution continuing to be to get yet
another expert opinion. My son and I will carry the scars of that abuse for the rest of our lives.
It's as if the court is seeking to have an expert validate its wisdom rather than admit that the
court got it wrong initially by not changing custody in the first place rather than waiting years
to finally do it.
For you, the Appellate Court, this is just another case; it doesn't cost you anything. It
has cost my son and me now nearly fourteen years and all that we have. Because it costs you
nothing, you do nothing.
Is there any such thing as the rule of law or a fair trial?

Respectfully submitted,

~~

Michael Blocker
Pro Se, Appellant
DATE: 3 December 2015
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of December 2015, I did hand deliver two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Wesley Felix, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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Word Count Certification
I, Michael Blocker, hereby certify that I prepared the foregoing brief and that the word
count for this brief is 8,010. I certify that I prepared this document in Word 2010, and
that this is the word count Word generated for this document.
December 3, 2015
Michael Blocker, Pro Se
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Appendix
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders.

(j) Orders.
(j)(1) Decision complete when signed; entered when recorded. However designated, the
court's decision on a motion is complete when signed by the judge. The decision is entered
when recorded in the docket.
(j)(2) Preparing and serving a proposed order. Within 14 days of being directed by the
court to prepare a proposed order confirming the court's decision, a party must serve the
proposed order on the other parties for review and approval as to form. If the party directed to
prepare a proposed order fails to timely serve the order, any other party may prepare a
proposed order confirming the court's decision and serve the proposed order on the other
parties for review and approval as to form.
(j)(3) Effect of approval as to form. A party's approval as to form of a proposed order
certifies that the proposed order accurately reflects the court's decision. Approval as to form
does not waive objections to the substance of the order.
(j)(4) Objecting to a proposed order. A party may object to the form of the proposed order
by filing an objection within 7 days after the order is served.
(j)(S) Filing proposed order. The party preparing a proposed order must file it:
0)(5)(A) after all other parties have approved the form of the order (The party preparing the
proposed order must indicate the means by which approval was received: in person; by
telephone; by signature; by email; etc.);
(j)(5)(B) after the time to object to the form of the order has expired (The party preparing the
proposed order must also file a certificate of service of the proposed order.); or
0)(5)(C) within 7 days after a party has objected to the form of the order (The party
preparing the proposed order may also file a response to the objection.).
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The Order of Court is stated below:
/ - · :;;,.;::-' · · ·\
Dated: July 06, 2015
/s/ James R.i':P!l~Q.b.,, )

03:44:03 PM
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Wesley D. Felix (6539)
MITCHELL BARLOW & MANSFIELD, P.C.
Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 998-8888
Facsimile: (801) 998-8077
Email: wfelix@mbmlawyers.com

Attorney for Petitioner Kirsteen Markel

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH-PROVO DEPARTMENT

KIRSTEEN BLOCKER nka KIRSTEEN
MORKEL,

ORDER MODIFYING CUSTODY
ORDER

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No.: 024402553

MICHAELP.BLOCKER,

Judge James R. Taylor

Respondent.

Commissioner: Thomas Patton

This matter came for a hearing before the Honorable James R. Taylor on June 10, 2015.
Petitioner was present, represented by counsel, Wesley D. Felix. Respondent was present and
appeared prose. THE COURT, after considering briefing, the argument of counsel and
otherwise being fully informed in this matter, and for good cause appearing ORDERS as
follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Court's provisional ruling, entered on August 22,

2014, which Order granted the Petitioner's Petition to Modify on a temporary basis providing for
the Petitioner's right to visitation consistent with the statutory minimum SHALL BE MADE
PERMANENT. Therefore, the Petition to Modify is GRANTED as follows:
1. Petitioner shall have the right to visitation with her minor son in a
manner consistent with the guidelines and statutory minimums as
established at Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35.
2. Each party is to bear their own costs and attorney fees.
This is the Final Order of THE COURT in this matter and no further Order is required.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 25th day of June 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing (PROPOSED) ORDER TEMPORARILY MODIFYING CUSTODY
ORDER AND SETTING ADDITIONAL MATTERS FOR HEARING WITHIN 90
DAYS to be served via the Court's electronic filing system upon all counsel of record

and by mail to the Respondent Michael P. Blocker.

Isl Wesley D. Felix
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MICHAEL P. BLOCKER

PROSE

1456 N. 350 EAST
OREM, UT 84057
801-420-3363

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KIRSTEEN BLOCKER,
Petitioner,

MOTION OBJECTING TO
PETITIONER'S ORDER OF JUNE 10,
2015
vs.
MICHAEL BLOCKER,
Respondent.

Civil No.: 024402553
Judge James Taylor

MICHAEL BLOCKER RESPONDS TO PETITIONER'S PROPOSED "ORDER
MODIFYING CUSTODY" of June 10, 2015, AS FOLLOWS:
The Petitioners proposed order does not have any findings of fact.
The Petitioners order does not state any basis in law, or any grounds for modification of
the standing court order of August 22, 2009.
The order referrers to the final order of the court dated August 22, 2009 as a provisional
ruling rather than "FINDINGS OF FACT, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT" that is stated on the
order of August 22, 2009.
The hearing of June 10, 2015 was scheduled to address the motions before the court,

hence there was no evidence presented to the court or an opportunity given to the Respondent to
prepare and present evidence to the court.

DATED this_ day of May 2014.

MICHAEL BLOCKER, Respondent

@

·-....;J

Certificate of Service

I certify that on this_ day of May 2014, I have mailed first-class postage prepaid a copy of
this motion to Petitioner's attorney.

Wesley D. Felix
Mitchell Barlow & Mansfield, P.C.
Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH

KIRSTEEN DIDI BLOCKER

NOTICE OF

Petitioner,

ORAL ARGUMENT

vs.
MICHAEL PHILLIP BLOCKER

Case No: 024402553 DA
Judge:
JAMES R TAYLOR

Respondent.

Date:

April 13, 2015

ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled.
Date:
06/10/2015
Time:
02:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth floor, Rm 403
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: JAMES R TAYLOR
This matter is scheduled for oral argument on the motion to
withdraw and all pending motions. Please plan to be present in
the courtroom for this hearing.
The court will provide an interpreter upon request. If you need
an interpreter, please notify the court at (801)429-1000 five
days before the hearing.
Individuals needing special accomodations (including auxiliary
communicative aids and services) should call the court at
(801)429-1037 three days prior to the hearing. For TTY service
call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128.

Case No: 024402553

Date: April 13, 2015

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 024402553 by the method and on the
date specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
Date:

WESLEY D FELIX wfelix@mbmlawyers.com
JANET GRIFFITHS PETERSON janet@heritagelawutah.com
04/13/2015

/s/ SHERRY A TAYLOR
Clerk/Clerk of Court
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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KIRSTEEN DIDI BLOCKER,
Petitioner,
vs.
~

MICHAEL PHILLIP BLOCKER,
Respondent.
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***

PRIVATE

***

Case No. 024402553

Oral Argument
Electronically Recorded on
June 10, 2015

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JAMES R. TAYLOR
Fourth District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
For the Petitioner:

Wesley D. Felix
MITCHELL, BARLOW & MANSFIELD
Boston Building
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 998-8888

For the Respondent:

Michael Phillip Blocker
(Appearing prose)
1456 North 350 East
Orem, Utah 84057

Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT
1771 South California Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-2927

-1-

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on June 10, 2015)

3
4

THE COURT: Call Blocker against Blocker.

Mr. Blocker,

-

you're here representing yourself?

(

5

MR. BLOCKER: Correct.

6

THE COURT: Mr. Felix, you're here for Ms. Blocker; is

7

that correct?

8

MR. FELIX: Yes, I am, your Honor.

9

THE COURT: Very good.

10

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: Your Honor, I entered a limited

11

appearance in October, and recently filed a withdrawal of

12

Counsel on that.

13

case the Court has any questions.

I just -- I'm here in abundance of caution in

14

THE COURT: A limited, limited appearance.

15

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: A very limited appearance.

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: If the Court has no further

18

All right, thank you.

questions, then --

19

THE COURT: I don't.

20

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: -- I'd like to be excused.

21

THE COURT: Thank you.

22

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: Okay.

23

THE COURT: Thanks.

You know, I've spent some time

24

reviewing this file trying to figure out exactly where we are

25

with this case.

Mr. Blocker, why don't you go first.

Tell me
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1

where you - - what you perceive the status of this case to be

2

and what is before me to decide.

3

4

MR. BLOCKER: Would you like be to take the podium or
just speak from here?

5

THE COURT : You can speak from there.

6

MR. BLOCKER : Okay , wha t

7

motions t hat I ' ve submitted.

8

Dr . B rgess '

9

petition to mod i y .

is before you are several

On my s jde

t h e motion t o strike

report , a .d a motion to str i ke o r withdraw the
Tnose are

wo main ones on my side .

li e

10

On her s ide her attorney ' s motion to withdraw , whi ch I don ' t

11

mave any objection to .

12

THE COURT : Summar i ze the case for me , Mr . F'elix.

13

Wh ere are we on

14

MR . FE

1

h e same

his case?

roblem as you ,

Hon o r ,

it ' s diff i cult , an

t h ink , since

eca se the docket is so long
many years , but c r tain1
wou

19

a

describe as a provis

22 ia•-'--- 1 U10 .

20

o
an

egan on

, ve

h is case

of i t ' s very o ld ,__go i n

t e wa:1. back to 2010 .

There was

THE COURT: Why wou l d you think it's provisional?
It was -- I have a copy of it here.

22

ruling?

23

that definitively defined custody and parent time that you

25

Wlia

nal order was entered on Feb r uary

21

24

aa

That was Ju dge Davis'

That seemed to me to be t he last operative ruling

MR. FELIX : I agree it may be the last operative, bu t
i t certainly was not final , and that's - -
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1
2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9

10

THE COURT: Why did you not characterize -- why would
you not characterize it as final?
MR. FELIX: Well, because there was an appeal.

I think

we attached the actual -THE COURT: Well, the appeal was -- the appeal was
stricken because it said it didn't have a final order.
MR. FELIX: Exactly, and the order that wasn't final
was the February 22 nd , 2010 order.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. FELIX: So clearly as of the time of (inaudible),

11

which I think was January in 2011, there had never been, and I

12

believe to this date never has been a final order.

13

THE COURT: Okay, well, we have-- we have a decree, and

14

we have a decree that actually gave-- I think it initially gave

15

custody to Mom.

16

to modify, and that was changed.

17

and as I see it right now, Dad has custody, Mom has statutory

18

visitation.

19

visitation which was supervised is no longer supervised; is

20

that accurate?

Then that was changed.

There was a petition

Custody was given to Dad;

What has changed since that was set up was her

21

MR. FELIX: Absolutely, your Honor.

22

THE COURT: Is that accurate?

23

MR. FELIX: The only emphasis I would add to that is

24

since August in 2014, to my knowledge everyone has behaved.

25

There haven't been any significant problems.

There's been
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1

visitation which I be l ieve is certainly in the best interest of

2

t he child on a regular basis --

3

THE COURT: Uh - huh , uh - hu h .

4

MR. FELIX :

according to the minimum vis itation

5

schedu le , and that has happened on an uninter - - excuse me - -

6

un in t erru p ted b asis for - -

7

THE COURT: Okay .

8

MR .

9

ELIX :
early

for nearly a year .
o

10

as it is continuing , an

11

of the c h ild .

So t ha t speaks , I

he fact that the situat i on can continue
i n t e oes

in eres

12

THE COORT : Okay: .

13

MR . FELIX : Tha ' s really all that we would want , your

14

is - -

15
16

THE COORT : So going forward , that ' s what
like is

17

MR . FE~

18

THE COURT : - -

19

MR . FE~.X : Yes , your Honor .

20

THE COURT : Al

21

ou wou"ld

That is a5solute y - S

atU...?-9UO

righ t .

Ocon i nue?

Mr . BlocKer , what is it t h at

you see?

22

M . B .OC K R : I seek to have the o r der of Ju d e Davis

23

continue as it was writ en .

24

visitation on a temporary basis .

25

ari l y .

Currently sh e does have statutory
You granted her that tempor -
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1

THE COURT : Wh_y shou ld n ·

2

MR . BLOCKER : Because it goes co ntrary to the o rde r o :

3

Jung e

avis.

4
5

make i -

THE COURT : ~o , g ive me a substantive reason .

That ' s

procedural .

6

MR. BLOCKER : Okay .

7

THE COURT : Substantive , what ' s in t he best in t erest of

8

t h is ch il d?

9
10

aOCKER : Oka_y , wel J , you ' r e as jn

MR .

cart::

THE COURT :

12

make a c hang e .

13

c hild ?

14

MR .

o,

wan

to h ea r you -e l] me wny

SlOU d

Wh~ is the present status guo noL best for your

OCRE~ : Bec ause her behavi ors hav en ' [ c h ang d.

Th e behavjor s that wer

consist.:en· wj Ch why she

os

custody

nav e noL c h an g e d.

17
18

he

orse .

11

16

me to pu

THE COURT : Specifi ca Jy?

Wha - has happ nea i n the

last yea r?

19

MR . BLOCKER : Your Honor , with all du e respect , we were

20

ca 7ed

21

you wanL me to adaress that I will , but - -

j

n :o r a ce r la in reas on .

wa s ere ared :or thaL .

.r

22

TAE COURT : I do .

23

MR. Bl.OCRER: Okay , the par ental a J iena ion behavior ,

24

th e ta . kin

25

abo u L me .

5a a

bouL

aB , Lr~ing Lo gel m

so n Lo La lk bad

-6 -

1
2

THE COURT : Do you have witnesses that can tel l me that
set this for hearing?

if

3

MR . BLOCKER :

4

bring i n Dr .

5

last seven

f we were going to have witnesses r'd

h orne , the c as e Court a p ointed therapist for t h e
ears , and

t h ink he cou ld share insight on t hat .

6

THE COO RT : Think , but you don t know?

7

MR . BaOCKER :

8

THE COURT :

9

MR .

10

' m pretty certain
retty certain .

LOCKER: He could , is what

' m sa ying.

TRE COURT : Part of t h e frustration

11

r

12

remember

13

it will serve us nest .

14

matter i-

15

Dr . - -

have here , one o

I ' m taking this ln an in orma

can .

because

t hi nk
t hi s

e xpec ea a more co mprehensive r port from

17

THE COURT : -- Burgess , yeah .
in

wa

want to g e t to the h eart o

MR~

- r ank ly,

f r ustration

h e motions that ' s pending bef o re me - -

16

18

hat he could .

OCKER : Burgess?

h e scop

19

but i

20

what s h e loo ed at , an

o

her report .

wasn ' t par·icuiariy h elQfuJ

I was djsappoin e ,
Sh e expressed an op ini on ,

to me .

· was very limited ,

her conclusio n s were ver y

im i ted .

21

MR . BLOCK ER : She wasn ' t

22

MR . FEL I X: If you want , we have indi cated , your Honor

23

icensed , nor did she fo l low- -

- - I apologize.

24

THE COURT: J u st a moment .

25

MR . FELIX : We have indicated , if we can put the funds

Go ahead .
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1

together, we would get another evaluator to more fully address

2

whatever your Honor ' s concerns are with respect to her ability

3

to have the child, see the child on regular visitat ions.

4

th inl< wha t r ' m in c lined

5

to - - be c a use t h is fi l e is suc h a 12 r oce dur al mess - - i t re a l ly

6

is.

7

these kinds o · ri l es , and J come in late , 1 take over

8

hav e been re cused ,

9

Things Enat h a ve h appen e d .

You k now ,

t hink I ' ve

robably reviewed thousands o f

there h ave be e n changes and a l . kinds o f

IO

MR . FELIX: Uh -huh.

11

Tl-IE COURT : Th e re a r~e a ]] kinds of motions .

12

a r e attorne y s withdr awing .

13

pl ea di n g , petj tions to slrike thal p eading aria all

14

stufT g oi ng o n ,

15

g oin g on i n t:hjs case .

16

the basjcs .

17

u g es

j E' s rea ll

There ar

peLiCions t o sLri e this

comp l x to t -

So wh a

Th e r e

kj

nd o

Lo ..Ll.gure out what ' s

I want to d o is djal iL back t o

Wh at we ' ve g ot is a 12 , soon to be J - year-old

18

man .

19

Tern orary ,

20

statutor

21

p1ace since

Hi s d a d h as sole
er manent

e aJ and
what e v e r ,

oun g

h sical cus t od y ri ght now .
t hat ' s wh a l h e ha s .

visit ation withou t supervision.

Mo m h a s

That ha s been in

o rd ered thaL abou · a year a g o .

22

MR . FELIX: Uh -huh.

23

TH E COU RT: Oka y ,

t hink

' m inclined , as far as

'm

24

concerned , to treat t h at as a p ermanent stale o f affai rs ri gh t

25

n o w.
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1

MR. FELIX : Okay .

2

THE COURT : Now , if either side wants to petition to

3

change things, then I'm going to require a renewed petition

4

to modify.

5

course .

6

it , but I think t h at ' s just the way - - that 's what I'm inc li ned

7

to d o .

I'm go i ng to require -- I ' m g oing to put a deadl ine on

Mr . Blocker.

8
9

We will litigate that in t he normal and ord inar y

MR . BLOCKER : Yes ,

would like to express on the record

that I s trenuous y object with tna

for the following - -

10

TR

11

MR . BLOCKER : - - for the

12

THE COURT : Overruled .

13

MR . B OCKtR : Okay , may I state the law regaraing this?

14

THE COURT : No , r • m familiar with the law .

15

allowing reasons .
That ' s what

' ~ doing .

That ' s my

ruling .

16
17

COURT : That ' s fine .

MR . BLOCKER : Rogue vs . Hogue , you ' re familiar with
that?

18

TRE COuRT : Mr . Blocker , t at ' s m

19

c:fiscretion in

20

be the best interest of the child .

hese matters , and

rulin

act from what

ave wide
perceive to

21

MR . BOCKER : But the law says that we can ' t --

22

THE COORT : Mr . Blocker , I don ' t inLend to argue w1 h

23

24
25

you .

That ' s my ruling .
MR. FELIX : On the motion to withdraw, yo u r Hono r,

we can put that in abeyance .

I --

I don't mind staying in place as

-9-

1

l ong as it takes to try to get things settled down .

2

like over the last year it ' s gone really we ll .

3

THE COURT: We ll, here's where we were.

It seems

I was going to

4

address that next.

5

moved to withdraw and I made you stay, because I had matters

6

that were pending.

7

hardship.

8

you do for a l i velihood .

9

I ' ve kind of kept you in here with -- you

I recognize that that ' s a difficulty and a

You don ' t do this for free .

This is - - this is what

My intent was to treat the ruling I just announced as

10

an order of t his Court , and I would have asked - - I would ask

11

y ou to reduce that to a written order .

12

pending .

At that point nothing's

13

MR. FELIX : Thank yo u , your Honor .

14

THE COURT: So if you want t o with

15

MR . FELIX: I guess I'm indicating I - - it's been so

16

much better over the last year.

17

think having me in the situ a tion somehow (inaudible) things.

18
19

THE COOR'.r :

I think i t ' s been great.

don ' L know .

his body language he ' s un h appy wi Lh 1-1ha C

20

r

21

visitation ana restrict her

22

23

Mr . Blocker ,

he wants t ~

i Li on Lo modi r-

can tell by

' m doingJ bu at t h is

arenl time

I

oi n

hat ' s
and

ram where

h L now , you can do t h at ; and we ' ll treat t h at as a
petition to modify .

24

I will do whatever discovery is reasonab l e and appro-

25

priate proportionate to that , and we ' l l schedule for a hearing

-1 0 -

1

as responsibly and quickly as I can .

2

1,ade t h rough the complexit y o

3

and counter pleadings and motions to s rike is not proauc ti ve

4

in tnis case and it ' s distracting the Court from the best

5

inEerest o

6

But

1

think trv i ng to

a 1 of the various pleadings

Ee c hi ld .

MR . BLOCKER : Oka , I wou d like you

o explain on

7

the record how we are jumping Eo modification without first

8

doing the firs

9

circumstances and Ehe circumstances that got her into the

step of addressing su stantial c h ange in

10

situation .

Tna

11

get

i n eres

o bes

I2
3

as no

happened .

So

' m not sure how we

when we have not addressed - -

THE COD~-r : Well ,

' m sorry that you

what Ive ruled and

on '

understa n d

my juris iction - -

14

MR . BLOCKER : 1 undersEand what yo u ' ve ruled .

15

TH

COURT : M~

locker , I ' m sorry

16

it .

17

treat the getition to moBif

18

ape ition to modif .

19

evidence in

20

Ehe bes

21

22

I ' ve made my rulin .

hat

ou don ' t get

have ear ier indicaEeB I would
- - or the order to show cause as

think there ' s satisfac

his file to demonstrate that wha

interest of the child .

satisfaclory
' m ruling is in

That ' s my order .

Mr . Felix , if you ' ll prepare an appropriate order ,
that ' s where we stand .

23

MR . FE LIX : Thank you very much .

24

THE COURT : Thank you .

25

(Hearing concluded )

We ' ll be in recess .
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~

KIRSTEEN DIDI BLOCKER,
Petitioner,

}
)
)
)

*** PRIVATE***

)

~

vs.

)

MICHAEL PHILLIP BLOCKER,

)
)

Case No. 024402553

)

Respondent.

)
)

Status Conference
Electronically Recorded on
August 1, 2014

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JAMES R. TAYLOR
Fourth District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
For the Petitioner:

Wesley D. Felix
MITCHELL, BARLOW & MANSFIELD
Boston Building
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 998-8888

For the Respondent:

Michael Phillip Blocker
(Appearing prose)
1456 North 350 East
Orem, Utah 84057

Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT
1771 South California Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-2927
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on August 1, 2014)

3

THE COURT : The first item on the docket is Blocker

4

against Blocker.

5

with Counsel.

6

t hi s case?

7

Mr . Blocker's here and Ms . Blocker ' s here

Th i s is a status conference .

Where ar

we on

What neeos Lo be done?

MR . FE LIX: Your Ho n or , we submitted the eva l uation of

8

Dr. Burgess that you should have.

9

THE COURT : Uh-huh , I do.

10

MR. FE LIX: We t hink on the

asis o f Ehat evaluation

11

~ou shou ld be abl e Lo now enLer an order granting statutory

12

visitaLion rigH s wiLhou

supe r vision Lo Ms . Bl ocker .

13

THE COURT : Mr. Blocker , do you want to be heard?

14

MR.

LOCKER : Yeah , given this is a sLatus conference ,

15

r'm go i.Jl.g

1

visitation report by Dr . Burgess , and ask Lo appoi n t eit h er

· o enL r a motion toaa y , a motion to st ri k - the

afl Davies or Dr . Feat h erstone as a new

18

eva J ualor .

19

THE COURT : Why?

20

P.IR . B ~OC l<:ER : Based on

he vis .i at.:ion regort by

21

Dr . Bu rg ess , once you fol . ow the Court order or gu id e l ines

22

· or doing it , a r e pro essiona J

23

Kirsteen and h er 12arents , my sel : and MB , none o

24

and seems to h ave comp l etely di sre g arded all o

25

from all pr evious e

uidelines . Sh e only interviewed
t: h e experts ,
Ehe repor s

er Ls .

-2-

1
2

THE COURT: Well, maybe we ought to l et her be cross
examined.

3

4

MR. FELIX : She's here and avai l able, if that's what
you'd like, your Honor.

Dr . Bur gess.

5

THE COURT: Thank you.

6

COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony you

Come on up.

7

are about to give in the case now p en ding before this Court

8

shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

9

so he lp you God?

10

THE WI TNESS: I do.

11

THE COURT : Thank you .

Please have a seat.

Counsel,

12

I'm going to have you take her first , if you ' l l l ay foundation

13

for the report.

14

MR. FELIX: Yes, your Honor .

15

THE COURT: Then I'll let Mr. Blocker.

16

MR . BLOCKER: Your Honor.

17

THE COURT: Yes.

18

MR . BGOCKER : Given that t h is is a status conference

19

ana

wasn ' t anticipating that we wou l d have wjtnesses .

20

THE COU RT : WelJ , you filed a motion .

21

MR~

OCKER :

' m about lo tile a motion 1

yes , but I

22

thou ght we ' d sc e - - this was a scheduling that we ' d schedule a

23

hearing to address the entire valuat ion , not have mv witnesses

24

here to r ebut .

25

I think it ' s very impor ~ant Eha

we

ave - -

THE COURT: Well, we can go that way if you want.

- 3-

1

Although this is an expert that's been appointed by t he Court

2

after -- by you were given an opportunity to provide a counter

3

expert , didn't.

4

expert we should appoint, and I appointed an expert, and I have

5

her recommendation .

I made the best judgment I could as to which

6

MR . BLOCKER: Well , based on - -

7

THE COURT : You don ' t want to cross

xam j ne at this

8

9

MR . BLOCKER : I would not l ike to have a hearin

10
11

Eime on

THE COURT : Wel l , tha · ' s f:ajr .

I3

yo u .

14

I ' m going to ao .

16

Me ' re g i ng lo let yous ep down .

9

' m going · o

That ' s fair .

based on Eh

rcporl that
think

1

Counse l ' s mo ion is we ]

fian

Well , here ' s whaL

do ha..;Le, J hich is Lh e status of t h e case right no

17
18

al wiLnesses

and i n Lhe Curt order I wasn ' L direcled Lo

12

. 5'

ave re5u

at

· aken .

So T ' m go i ng [o strjke the requirement
visitation al Lhis time .
to al low furt h er Les j mony .

or superv ised

wi l l set the matter f or hearing
We ' Jl have the experL corn

and

20

you can provide other a dil i onal supportive evidence and ot h er

21

aad i tiona

22

it wi ll take to conduct that hearing?

coun er ev i dence as

ou wjsh.

How long do you t hink

23

MR. BLOCKER: Um --

24

THE COURT: How many witnesses do yo u anticipate?

25

MR. BLOCKER : - - I antic i pate approximate l y t hree

- 4-

1

witnesses.

2
3

THE COURT: Okay, do you anticipate anyone other than
perhaps your client and the expert?

4

MR. FELIX: No, that would be sufficient, your Honor.

5

THE COURT: Okay, I think I have a date, probably do it

6

then.

Sherry?

7

COURT CLERK: How much time do they need, Judge?

8

THE COURT: Half a day.

9

COURT CLERK: August 25 th , 1:30.

10
11

When do we have a half a day?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Judge, I tried to contact the
people he told me to and I didn't get

12

MR. FELIX: We don't need to --

13

THE COURT: No, no, no, that's okay.

14

15
16

We'll hear about

the -MR. FELIX: I've got a trial in California starting
August 25 th and going for a month, so

17

THE COURT: Okay.

18

COURT CLERK: September 9 th , 9 o'clock.

19

THE COURT: Well, your trial goes for a month?

20

MR. FELIX: Three weeks to four weeks, your Honor, yes.

21

THE COURT: So we're going to look at October.

22

COURT CLERK: October.

23

MR. FELIX: That's okay.

24

THE COURT: Open?

25

MR. BLOCKER: That's open.

October 14 th , 9 o'clock.

-5-

1

THE COURT : While she ' s here, is that a day that will

2

work?

3

th e order o

4

pl ace with o ut supervis i on .

5

6

NR .
your Ho nor

7
8

11
12
J. 3

14

15

All right , 9 o ' clock on the 14 t h •
Eh e Court is that the vi sitation will - - may take

·E

r x:

Th e ti mi ng , Eli e ex Len L o f t h

an

v is ita tio n 1

wou l d t h at b e th e minimum s Latut o ry visitation?

THE COURT : Uh - h un , s La tut or y v:i itaUon .

J aon ' t

see

reason t o d o a nyLhi ng di f ferent.

9

10

Okay .

MR . BLOCKER:

wou ld lik e t o objec t t o that , aJt h ou g

l know

TAE COURT : Oka y ,
hear th at a

· h e time o

app rec i ate

our objection , and

' Il

Lh e - -

MR . BLOCKER : 1 tnoug ht this wa s a s Latus conference ,
not a con erence where we would make an order .
THE COURT : 1 don ' L h ave a basis Lo continue .

J. 6

on the status of l e fil e ,

17

th e su ervision order .

18

we ' ll see you here i n October .

Based

d on ' t h ave a basis Lo cont in ue

If you ' ll prepare a n appropriate o rder

19

MR. FELIX : Yes , your Honor .

20

THE COURT : Thank you .

Thank you.

You know , just to be clear , so

21

nobody is surprised , let's have you each disclose a complete

22

list of the witnesses you intend to call in October. Any reason

23

you can't do that t hr ee weeks b e fore the hearing?

24

additiona l exhibits that you intned to attach so that both

25

sides have notice .

Inc l ude a n y

- 6-

Iii}

Vi)

--

1

MR. FELIX: So an exhibit list and a

2

THE COURT: And a witness list, uh-huh.

3

MR. FELIX: Thank you, your Honor.

4

THE COURT: Thank you.

5

(Hearing concluded)

Yes.

-7-
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FILED
AUG 2 5 2014
4TH DISTRICT
~ATEOFUTAH
- ,61\H QOUNTV

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------------------------------

Kirsteen Blocker nka Kirsteen Morkel,
Petitioner

------------

Minute Entry Regarding Order for
Hearing of August 1, 2014 and Motion
Of Counsel to Withdraw.

vs.

Date: August 22, 2014

Michael P. Blocker,

Case Number: 024402553

Respondent

(V

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

-----------------------------------------------------------------This matter was before the Court on August 1, 2014. The Court received the written
report of the custody evaluator appointed by the Court at the request of the parties. An
evidentiary hearing was scheduled to allow further examination of the evaluator through
examination and cross examination. The Court made a temporary modification to the conditions
of parent time and ordered counsel for the Petitioner to prepare an appropriate order. An order
has been prepared. Mr. Blocker has objected to the form of the order and submitted a competing
order. The Court has reviewed both orders and is satisfied that the order proposed by the
petitioner more accurately reflects the intent of the Court on August 1. The Court will, therefore,
electronically sign the proposed order submitted by the Petitioner.
The Court also notes, during a review of the file, that counsel for the Petitioner has
moved for leave to withdraw from this case because he feels he can no longer represent the
Petitioner on a pro bona basis. The court is sympathetic to that dilemma. However, this has
Page 1 of 3

been an unusually stressful, high conflict action. An evidentiary hearing is presently scheduled
for October 14, 2014 which could dramatically affect the relationship of the parties to each other
and to their child. If Mr. Felix is allowed to withdraw at this time it may be difficult for the
Petitioner to locate appropriate substitute counsel to be prepared to continue with the case at that
time. The motion to withdraw is respectfully denied although the motion may be renewed if
substitute counsel for the Petitioner enters an appearance.
Dated this 22 nd day of August, 2014

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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'VJJ

Copies of this Order distributed to;
Counsel for the Plaintiff: wfelix@mbmlawyers.com
Defendant (self represented): Michael P. Blocker

Distributed this

1i.

day of ~ l _ , as noted above.
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The Order of Court is stated below:
,
-;;· · \
Dated: August 22, 2014
Isl James R.('.P~ylit-:.> )
03:12:36 PM
Districr-.~Qµr:t).~d.ge,/

·-<. -~ .i~: ..:·.:~;',~,··

Wesley D. Felix (6539)
MITCHELL BARLOW & MANSFIELD, P.C.
Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 998-8888
Facsimile: (801) 998-8077
Email: wfelix@mbmlawyers.com

Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KIRSTEEN BLOCKER nka
KIRSTEEN MORKEL

(PROPOSED) ORDER TEMPORARILY
MODIFYING CUSTODY ORDER

Petitioner,

v.
MICHAEL P. BLOCKER,
Res ondent.

Case No.: 024402553
Jud e: James R. Ta lor

A hearing was held on August 1, 2014. Petitioner was present, represented by counsel,
Wesley D. Felix. Respondent was present and appeared prose. Based upon the evidence
presented at the modification hearing held on April 16, 2014, and the report submitted by the
court appointed expert Dr. Victoria Burgess, who appeared and was available to provide
testimony, THE COURT, having reviewed Dr. Burgess's report, and relevant matters in the file,
and otherwise being fully informed in this matter, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. Petitioner's right to visitation, consistent with the statutory minimums
established at Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-35, is to be continued, on a
temporary basis, without supervision. No supervision is to be required for
exchanges or during the exercise of parent time.
2. Respondent, having declined to cross-examine Dr. Burgess, will be
granted the opportunity to do so at a hearing to be held on October 14,
2014 at 9:00 a.m. Three weeks before the hearing, each side shall submit
exhibit lists and witness lists.

***EXECUTED AND ENTERED BY THE COURT AS INDICATED BY THE
DATE AND SEAL AT THE TOP OF THE PAGE***

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of August, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing (PROPOSED) ORDER TEMPORARILY MODIFYING CUSTODY ORDER
to be sent via first-class mail, U.S. postage prepaid, to:
Michael P. Blocker
1456 N. 350 E.
Orem, UT 84057

Isl Jennifer Latzke

FILED

FEB .2 2 2010
~~lRICT

llrAH~

IN THE FOURTFI JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIRSTEEN BLOCKER,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, ORDER, AND
JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No.: 024402553

MICHAEL P. BLOCKER.
Judge: Lynn W. Davis
Respondent.

This matter came for a three-day trial before the Honorable Lynn W. Davis on the twentyfourth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-seventh of August 2009. Respondent was present, represented
by counsel, Ron D. Wilkinson and Kristin Gerdy. Petitioner was also present, appearing prose.

The minor child was represented by his Guardian ad Litem, Kelly Peterson. After hearing the
testimony of witnesses and argument from both parties and the Guardian ad Litern and carefully
considering the evidence and arguments provided by all.parties and for good cause appearing, the
Court finds and orders as follows:
Background
I.

Historically, this has been a very high-conflict and acrimonious case that has been
ongoing since 2002; the court has at least twelve volumes to its file.

2.

The ongoing nature of litigation in this case is not in the best interest of the parties nor,
most importantly, in the best interest of their child,
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3.

The Court finds that Dr. Feathers·to;ne's observations six years ago (2003) are not only
applicable in the current circumstances but continue to plague the relationships involved
in this case.

4.

The Court has engaged, appointed, or become aware of at numerous professionals in th.is
case including clinical psychologists, licensed clinical social workers, mediators, and
special masters, including Dr. Darin Featherstone; Dr . .Jon Skidmore; Dr. Jay Jensen; Dr.
Lois Dettenmaier; Liz Dalton, Esq.; Dr. Douglas Goldsmith; Anna Trupp, LCSW; Dr.
Pam Wilkerson; Val Cox; Dr. Kirk Thorn; Dr. Matthew Davies, and Amanda Bollinger.

5.

Despite the efforts of these and other professionals, Kirsteen Morkel has a history of not
working with, not paying, or not establishing apQropriate professional relationships with
therapists and other professionals . The Court is concerned about this history and the
impact on the parties' minor child.

6.

The Court takes judicial notice of the prior hearings held before this court, as well as the
court's files and records in this matter. The Court also notes that Ms. Morke] was in no
manner denied the right to present evidence or testimony, including expert testimony and
that Dr. Davies's testimony was previously subject to vigorous cross examination by two

of her former attorneys.
Co-parenting
7.

Kirsteen Morkel states specifically that she wishes to continue her custodial relationship
and that primary custody ought to remain with her. Consideration of co-parenting was
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declined.
8.

It is a challenge to structure parenting when one parent states she cannot or will not coparent with the other parent. In addition, the court notes that these parties are
geographically isolated from each other.

9.

The Court finds that Kirsteen Markel has interfered with Mackay Blocker's relationship
with his father, Michael Blocker, and with their past parent-time, but such incidents
originate from her desire to operate in the best interests of her son.

10.

The Court :finds that Michael Blocker has welcomed any active, open, cooperating, and
balanced participation of Mackay' s mother.

I 1.

The Court finds that no joint physical or legal custody of Mackay Blocker is possible.

12.

Therefore, for the reasons stated throughout these findin s of fact, the Court finds that it

is in the best interest of Mackay Blocker to have his father Michael Blocker, identified as
his rimary legal and nhysical caregiver 1 being awarded sole legal and physical custody of
the parties ' minor child, Mackay Blocker.
Custody Evaluation
13 .

Most recently, the parties stipulated to a custody evaluation by Dr. Matthew Davies.

14.

The Court finds Dr. Davies to be credible and his evaluation and recommendations to be
thorough, including his recort1rnendation to temporarily change custody of Mackay
Blocker from his mother to his father in October 2008.

15 .

It is the opinion of the Court that Dr. Davies has very carefully followed the guidelines in
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Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-903 while completing his report.
16.

Dr. Davies included an" enmeshment theory" in his custody evaluation .

17.

The Court finds that although enmeshment is not a diagnosable condition and although
there may be other conditions involved in this case including, but not limited to,
Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS), the concerns
set forth in Dr. Davies's report, including enmeshment, are serious.

18.

The Court awards sole leg;al and physical custody of the parties' minor child, Mackay
Blocker, to Respondent, Michael Blocker. In doing so, the Court adopts the findings in
Dr. Davies' s report, in particular those found within his "Summary" section and within
his examination of the Rule 4-903 factors . But the Court' s reliance is not exclusive. For
example, the Court notes that no summary finding addresses the complexities and
interrelationship between enmeshment and Pervasive Developmental Disorder - Not
Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS).
Mackay Blocker' s Parent-Time With His Mother

19.

The Court finds that Kirsteen Morkel does not have the financial ability to continue
paying for supervised parent-time.

20.

It is the recommendation of both the court-appointed custody evaluator, Dr. Davies, and
the child ' s therapist, Dr. Thorn, that Kirsteen Morkel 's parent-time continue to be
supervi sed until such time that s]1e demonstrates that she has changed her mind set with
regard to her own parenting abiliti es and Michael Blocker' s relationship with the child.
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21.

The Court is concerned that, at this time, an exclusively supervised recommendation is
not practical due to finances and would, therefore, interfere with her relationship with her
son, Mackay Blocker.

22.

Therefore, the court shall Qermit Kirsteen Merkel unsupervised parent-time consistent
with Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-35, upon verification of her participation in individual
therapy, joint therapy with Mackay and Dr. Thorn, and her retention of a Special Master
as set forth herein.

23.

It is in the best interests of Mackay to continue therapy with Dr. Thorn because of his
genuine and practical approach and efforts and his history in Mackay's therapy.

24.

All pre- and post-visit exchanges will occur at the American Fork ACAFS facility.

25.

The Court asked Kirsteen Markel on the record if she understood the conditions for her
parent-time (i.e. verification of her participation in individual therapy, verification of her
participation in joint therapy with Mackay and Dr. Kirk Thom and verification of the
retention of a Special Master).

26.

In open court and in the presence of all in attendance, Kirsteea Morke1 affirmed that she
understood the courfs conditions.

27.

The Com1 recognizes tbat awarding Kirsteen Morkel statulory parent-time is an
experiment as she has been unable to cooperate with at least twelve ( 12) past
professionals, but the Court finds that it is in Mackay Blocker's best interest to rrive her
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one more chance. The Court invited her to cooperate with her therapist, Dr. Thome, the
court-appointed Special Master, her individual therapist, etc, as it is essential that she do
so. Cooperation is in the best interests of Mackay Blocker.
Contempt Allegations

28.

There have been repeated claims and allegations that Ms. Morkel has repeatedly violated
the orders of the Court, including interfering with Mr. Blocker's parent-time, failing to
properly cooperate with the child's therapists (both Ms. Trupp and Dr. Thorne), failing to
properly cooperate with the custody evaluator (including timely payment of fees), failing
to properly cooperate with other professionals, failing to properly cooperate with the
child' s education assessment, failing to properly cooperate with exchanges, and failing to
meet her financial obligations.

29.

Nonetheless, the Court declines to find Kfrsteen Markel in contempt at this time.

30.

However, if she fails to comply with any order herein, the Court may reconsider this
ruling at a later date.

Kirsteen Morkel's Finances
31.

The Court finds that, at this time, Kirsteen Merkel does not have the financial ability to
pay attorney fees.

32.

The Court finds that Kirsteen Morkel has an inherent and ongoing obligation to
financially support her son, Mackay, and she was not absolved of that obligation during
October 2008-August 2009 when Mackay was in his father's custody.
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33.

The Court imputes minimum wage to Kirsteen Markel for purposes of child support.
Mackay' s Therapy

34.

Mackay is to continue in therapy with Dr. Kirk Thorn.

35.

Therapy with Dr. Thorn will become joint including both Mackay Blocker and his
mother, Kirsteen Morkel.

36.

This ther@y order will nol be changed without further courl order or by recommendation
of the Special Master assigned to this case.

37.

The Court orders that Kirsteen Morkel actively participate and coo crate with Dr. Thom
in all as ects of thera y.
Kirsteen Morkel's Individual Therapy

38.

The Court orders that Kirsteen Morkel shall actively engage in separate, individual
therapy with a therapist of her choice.

39.

She shall follow the treatment recommendations of the therapist.

40.

The purposes of the therapy and the goals of the therapy shall be to address the needs
indicated in the following reports from the third-party professionals in this case: Dr.
Detlenmaier's letter of 11/26/05; Dr. Goldsmith's letter of 11/24/05; Dr. Skidmore's
letter of 1/2/05; Dr. 1-ligashi 's Psychological Evaluation of 2004, Dr. Featherstone's
Custody Evaluation Report of 3/28/03, and Dr. Davies's Custody Evaluation of March
2009.

41.

Ki rs teen Markel' s individual therapy order will not be changed without further court
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order or by recommendation o.f the Special Master.
Anticipated Events
42.

The Court is hopefuJ and expects that Kirsteen Morkel will make significant progress in
both her parenting skills and in her relationship with Mackay and Michael Blocker.
Special Master

43.

The parties shall select with Rick Jackman or Sandra Dredge as Special Master for this
case.

44.

If the parties cannot agree on a choice of Special Master, the Court will decide between
Mr. Jackman and Ms. Dredge.

45.

A standardized Special Master Order shall issu.e. Once said order is signed and the
Special Master's full retainer has been paid by Ms. Morkel, the selected Special Master
shall be considered retained.

46.

The.Court orders that Kirsteen Morkel will initially pay the entirety of any retainers
required by the Special Master. Beyond the issue of initial retainer, each party shall pay

50% of the Special Master fees except as provided below.
47.

In the event that conflicts arise the court will reserve determination of ultimate payment

such that if a conflict does not have any basis, the full cost may be borne by the party
bringing the claim.
48.

The Special Master may address any claims of previously missed parent-time by either
party.
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49.

The Special Master will address concerns regarding the participation of Kirsteen
, Morkel's parents, Neil and Isabel Morkel, in her parent-time with Mackay, as well as

,·.
~

where her parent-time may take place. The Court emphasizes that it is imperative that
Mackay retain and be afforded a nurturing relationship with Neil and Isabel Morkel.
~

Kirsteen ·Morkel 's Parent-Time
50.

All pre- and post-visit exchanges will occur at the American Fork ACAFS facility.

51.

The parties will evenly share the costs of ACAFS' s services.

52.

Maternal grandparents (Neil and Isabel Morkel) shall not be at exchanges.

53 .

The parties will follow the recommendations of ACAFS regarding exchanges and shall

viJ

.J

cooperate with ACAFS in the scheduling of exchanges and otherwise.

Future Abuse Allegations
54.

Neither party shall bring before this Court or other court, another abuse, neglect, or
maltreatment allegation unless it is accompanied by a written statement by a therapist,
professional supervisor, DCFS caseworker, police officer, or other third-party
professional who states that they have read Dr. Dettenmaier's letter of 11/26/05; Dr.
Goldsmith/s letter of 11/24/05; Dr. Skidmore's letter of 1/2/05; Dr. Higashi's
Psychological Evaluation of 2004; Dr. Featherstone's Custody Evaluation Report of
3/28/03, and Dr. Davies's Custody Evaluation of March 2009, and this order, and still
believes that there is credible evidence that abuse, neglect, or maltreatment of the child
has occurred.
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Attorney Fees
· 55.

The Court awards attorney fees to Michael Blocker for his fees in connection with his
Motion to Compel and Renewed Motion to Compel.

56.

The Court directs Mr. Wilkinson and Ms. Gerdy to submit an affidavit of such fees.
Guardian Ad Litem Fees

57.

Because of the parties' inability to pay, the Court awards no fees to the Office of the
Guardian ad Litem.
Child Support

58.

The Court orders Kirsteen Markel to pay child support, including retroactive support for
October 2008 through August 2009, which includes reimbursing Michael Blocker for
$150 of support that he paid previously for the second half of October 2008, when
Mackay was in his custody.

59.

The Court imputes minimum wage to Kirsteen Morkel for purposes of child support.

60.

Michael Blocker's income is $4,000 per month, based on past years. However, his
current income is considerably less.

61.

Therefore, the support amount Kirsteen Morkel owes is $161.00 per m.onth.

62.

The Court grants a judgment against Kirsteen Markel in the amount of $1,760.00 to
Micha.el Blocker to cover ten months of unpaid support (at $161.00 per month) ~nd
reimbursement of $150.00 for October 2008.
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Medical and Dental Costs and Other Financial Matters
63.

The Court orders Kirsteen Morkel to pay $1,187.42 to Dr. Davies to complete the balance
owed for his fees.

64.

Th~ Court grants ajudgment against Kirsteen Morkel to Michael Blocker for $1,525.99 to
reimburse him for fees he paid to Dr. Davies for which she was responsible.

65.

The Court orders Kirsteen Morkel to pay one-half of Mackay Blocker's medical and
dental insurance and any uncovered expenses..

66.

The Court grants a judgment against Kirsteen Morkel to Michael Blocker to reimburse
him for any unpaid medical and dental expenses after the amount of such expenses is
provided by Michael Blocker.
Mackay Blocker's Passport

67.

The Court orders Kirste_en Morkel's former counsef Wendy Lems to submit Mackay
Blocker's passport to the Court within ten (10) days of August 27, 2009.

68.

The Court will hold the passport until such time a motion is made for its release.
Tax Dependent

69.

The Court orders that Michael Blocker may hereafter claim Mackay Blocker as a
dependent on his taxes each year, unless otherwise agreed by Petitioner and Respondent.

--4i

vlj)

Provisions from Previous Orders that Shall Continue as Orders
70.

The Court's order incorporates the following prnvisions of earlier orders of this court:

71.

The parties shall only communicate via text message, email, ACAFS, or mail for the
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limited purpose of arranging parent-time and addressing child-relate~ issues. All
communication shall be civil. The child shall not be used as a messenger between the
parties. Other than as indicated herein, the parties shall have no direct or indirect contact
with one another.

72.

Maternal grandparents shall not be at exchanges.

73.

No one shall be allowed to discuss with the child or otherwise receive, solicit, or
encourage non-sp~ntaneous disclosures regarding the abuse, neglect, maltreatment or any
prior bad acts allegations except law enforcement, the Guardian ad Litem, a professional
supervising agency, a therapist for purposes of therapy (as opposed to forensic purposes),
or a licensed, trained professional in the course of a forensic investigation or evaluation, a
Special Master or the Division of Child and Family Services.

74.

The parties shall refrain from making derogatory or disparaging comments about or to the
other parent, or allow any other person, when within the hearing of the minor child, to do
so.

75.

The parties shall not argue with each other

of their paramours within the hearing or

conscious presence of the parties' minor child or allow any other person to do so.
76.

The parties shall not discuss any aspect of these proceedings, any proceeding where the

child is the subject of the litigation, or any criminal proceeding to which the other parent
is a party, in the presence or hearing of the child, or allow any third person to do so,
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except as set forth above.
77.

The parties will not question, interrogate, or otherwise ''pump,, the child for information
regarding what occurs when the child is with the other parent, or allow any other person
to do so, except as set forth above.

78.

The parties wilJ in no way conduct themselves in a way that would tend to diminish the
love of the child for the other parent, or allow any other person to do so.

79.

The parties shall not encourage the child to take sides or develop a parental preference, or
allow any other person to do so. The parties will not in any way punish the child for
having or appearing to have a parental preference, or allow any other person to do so.

80.

Parties will follow the recommendations of the professional supervising agency regarding
exchanges.

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 024402553 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL:

MAIL:
Date:

RONALD D WILKINSON 815 E 800 S OREM, UT 84097
KlRSTEEN MORKEL 2272 GAMBEL OAK DR SANDY UT 84092

-~~~~~CU~~=:,.::....~~.-----..
Deputy Court Clerk
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